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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of foreign assistance, according to Catholic social thought, is integral human development.  The 
phrase comes from Populorum Progressio (1967), recently described by Pope Benedict XVI as “the 
Rerum Novarum of the present age.”2  In Populorum Progressio, Pope Paul VI placed the condition of 
poor-country populations at the center of the church’s social concern, much as Rerum Novarum (1891) 
had done for industrial-country workers.   
 
We focus on economic growth in this paper because of its powerful links to poverty.  Our premise is that 
freedom from destitution, not just in a material sense but also in terms of meaningful work and social 
inclusion, is a necessary condition for achieving integral human development.  Economic growth follows 
as a means to the same end, because robust economic growth is virtually a necessary condition for 
alleviating poverty on a sustainable basis.3  
 
What matters for economic growth is accumulation of human and physical assets – literacy, health, 
factories, and capital equipment – and the implementation of new ideas and technologies.  Economists 
use the term “investment environment” to describe the incentives households, farms, and firms face to 
educate their children, improve their land, and try out new business ideas.  A strong investment 
environment is one in which a broad spectrum of individuals can access favorable investment 
opportunities and finance them at reasonable cost.  At bottom, our paper is about the evolving 
investment environment in Africa.   
 
Two dimensions of the investment environment are critical, in our view, to thinking about development 
and aid in Africa.  The first is an institutional setup that secures the rights to market participation and 
property for a large spectrum of society.  Households will not undertake investments if they are legally 
excluded from markets, as in an apartheid system or a collectivized agriculture, or if their investments 
face a serious risk of expropriation by private or public actors.  Sustaining a strong investment 
environment therefore requires an expectation of what the economist Paul Collier calls enforced 
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justice.4  In the absence of such an expectation, investment activity will shrink and such investment as 
may occur will go to socially unproductive ends – capital flight, protection or extortion, or armed 
conflict.   
 
Enforced justice implies an absence of overbearing government controls on private economic 
transactions.  This requirement accommodates a variety of approaches to market regulation but 
excludes what the economist Mancur Olson calls ‘market contrary’ regimes, in which governments 
systematically penalize or displace private activity.5  By itself, however, enforced justice is not enough.  A 
stable, secure, and reasonably market-oriented environment may be an economically stagnant one if a 
few other collective goods are absent.  Our second dimension is therefore the provision of core public 
infrastructure and services, including roads, ports, schools, health systems, and agricultural extension.   
The favorable impact of these inputs on the return to private investment provides an enticing rationale 
for foreign aid: if donors can bring in the know-how, the infrastructure, and the public services for a 
temporary period, perhaps the private sector can do the rest.6  But well-functioning public institutions 
are just as critical to securing this dimension of the investment environment as they are to securing the 
provision of enforced justice.  Governments must develop the domestic capacity to set public 
investment priorities, maintain public assets, and deliver services.  
 
Poverty alleviation, then, is critical to the project of integral human development; economic growth is 
critical to poverty alleviation; growth requires private investment in human and physical assets; and the 
investment environment, at bottom, is a matter of public institutions.  Against this background we 
develop two main points about development and aid in Africa.  The first is that the investment 
environment in Africa is stronger today than it has been at any time since independence.  This is largely 
because of internal political and economic reforms, which were mainly driven by crisis and the end of 
the Cold War, but for which donors can also take some credit.  Africa’s populations remain poor and 
vulnerable, and country experiences are heterogeneous.  But an epoch-making transition has taken 
place in the investment environment, and we think it will be sustained.   
 
Second, the nature of external assistance is changing, in ways that are positive but also uncertain for 
what lies ahead.  Key drivers of change include the end of the Cold War, which created the space for a 
revitalization of aid based on the Millennium Development Goals, and the increasing involvement of 
new private and public actors in the development assistance arena, each with somewhat distinct 
agendas and capabilities from those of the traditional donors.   
 
We close the paper by arguing that although the scope for integral human development is wider now in 
Africa than it has ever been, some of the challenges facing faith-based aid organizations may become 
more rather than less acute over the coming decade.   
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2. A framework for classifying governance regimes 
 
Our first argument is that Africa’s post-independence economic history took a fundamental turn for the 
better in the mid-1990s.  To establish this, we start in the late colonial period.  We focus on the 
evolution of governance regimes, defined as the institutional arrangements that govern the 
prioritization, financing, and delivery of the collective goods that shape an economy’s investment 
environment.  
 
Table 1 proposes a framework for tracking the evolution of governance regimes over time.  We 
distinguish alternative regimes on two basic dimensions: who carries out the prioritization and delivery 
of collective goods, and who finances them.  Along the rows, we track the role of the domestic public 
sector in prioritizing and delivering public goods and services.  This runs on a continuous and multi-
dimensional scale in practice, but for simplicity we compress the alternatives into low and high.  The 
colonial regimes in Africa clearly belong in the bottom row; even under indirect rule, key governance 
functions in the colonial territories were carried out by the colonial foreign office or its local proxies.  
Politically independent middle-income countries, by contrast, belong in the upper row because only 
under extraordinary conditions would conquest or financial collapse make them the wards of external 
interests.   
 
Table 1  Governance regimes and the provision of collective goods in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Governance  
regimes 
Role of the non-mineral domestic economy  
in financing collective goods 
Low High 
Role of the 
domestic 
government 
in prioritizing 
and 
delivering 
collective 
goods 
High 
 
 
            Emerging Africa 
 
 
   Middle-Income Countries 
Low 
Development  
Dependencies 
 
               Failed States 
          Colonial Regimes 
 
 
The columns track financing.  National collective goods can be financed in three basic ways: foreign 
grants, rents on exports of primary commodities, especially minerals (in Africa: oil, gold, copper, coltan, 
diamonds7), or the domestic taxation of non-mineral production and trade.8     
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The columns of Table 1 distinguish economies in which domestic tax revenues are the main source of 
public spending from those in which aid or mineral rents are the main source.  We are of course 
generalizing, but our aim is to confer a special status on domestically-generated revenues.  The 
sociologist Max Weber famously defined the state as that entity with a monopoly of force over a given 
territory.  What we are emphasizing in Table 1 is that the nature of that monopoly – and particularly its 
political legitimacy – may depend in fundamental ways on whether the government’s coercive power 
relies on external resources or on a political and institutional bargain that supports taxation of the 
governed.9 
 
Before independence, most territories in SSA were in the southeast box of Table 1, self-supporting in the 
economic sense but not self-determining.  The sine qua non of colonialism was external control, so 
infrastructure and enforced justice were supplied by the colonial office or its local agents, on behalf of 
expatriate or settler interests and mainly in support of external trade.  But the domestic economy bore 
the brunt of providing collective goods: the European powers insisted that their colonies be largely self-
sustaining economically, at least until quite late in the colonial period.  In contrast, politically 
independent middle-income countries like Argentina or Brazil were self-supporting and self-
determining.  They occupied the northeast box, financing collective goods through domestic resources 
as in the African colonies, but in control of prioritization and delivery in a way that African populations 
were not. 
 
In their own domains, of course, the European colonial powers were firmly in the northeast corner.  At 
home, they maintained the security of property claims through internal and institutionalized 
mechanisms that included independent judiciaries, multi-party elections, a capable civil service, active 
local governments, and a high degree of civil liberties.  They financed collective goods via domestic 
taxation, a process legitimized not just by competitive executive elections but by a range of 
complementary checks and balances on the public purse.  In these respects their behavior abroad was in 
fundamental contrast to their behavior at home.10  In the colonies, they imposed non-contestable and 
authority-based regimes that vested security in themselves and provided justice and public services on a 
selective basis, in order to favor their own economic interests. 
 
3. Governance and growth to 1994 
 
As political independence became inevitable in Africa following World War II, the declining imperial 
powers sought to engineer a transition that would secure their political and economic interests.  Where 
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 Loans are a fourth option, but we subsume them in the other three because they ultimately have to be repaid via 
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9
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 edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2010. 
10
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transition was peaceful – and in some cases even where it was not – new governments came to power 
under Western-style constitutions and with promises of both aid and trade.   
 
Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first President, famously said “Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all the 
rest shall be added unto ye.”  To Nkrumah and his contemporaries, self-determination ensured a vertical 
transition from the bottom row of Table 1 to the top row (we denote this transition by a clear arrow).  
Political sovereignty would allow a re-direction of public spending priorities away from colonial interests 
and in favor of the overall population.  This would unleash modernization and growth.  Independence-
era leaders embraced the work and promise of economic transformation: “We must run” said 
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere “while others walk.” 
 
Between Sudan’s independence in 1956 and the publication of Populorum Progressio in 1967, nearly 
three-quarters of the population of SSA – 31 countries – came to political independence.11  Global 
economic growth was robust in the 1960s, providing some temporary comfort to the view that 
sovereignty meant prosperity.   In hindsight, however, this narrative barely outlasted the mid-1970s.  
From the viewpoint of Table 1, only a few countries in Africa found institutional pathways to a strong 
private investment environment during the three decades that followed Sudan’s independence in 1956.  
A handful of authoritarian regimes – like Kenyatta’s in Kenya and Felix Houghouet-Boigny’s in Cote 
d’Ivoire – created temporary umbrellas of protection for business interests, but these protections did 
not survive political succession.  The majority of regimes regarded private economic success with 
suspicion.12  By the mid-1970s most countries had made a transition to one-party states or military 
dictatorships in which the state controlled, or attempted to control, large parts of the economy.13 
 
Figure 1 summarizes Africa’s growth performance between 1974 and 1994 on a country-by-country 
basis.  Each country in SSA is represented by a dot, the height of which indicates the average growth 
rate of per-capita income in that country over the full period.  We have arranged the countries from left 
to right in declining order of growth.  One of the fastest-growing countries in the world during this 
period, Botswana, is the left-most dot.  On the far right is Liberia, where incomes contracted at the 
extraordinary rate of 10 percent per year.  We forego labels in favor of circles that surround each dot 
and indicate the size of the country’s population.   Larger circles correspond to larger countries; Nigeria, 
the largest by far with a population of well over 110 million during this period, appears roughly in the 
middle of the diagram, with an annual growth rate of -0.5 percent.  
 
Two pieces of context may help bring these dots alive.  First, we are looking at a 20-year period, so small 
differences matter.  A country growing at the modest rate of 2 percent per year, for example, will have 
nearly twice the per-capita income, after 20 years, than if it had contracted at 1 percent per year; a 
country growing at 6 percent will have twice again.  Second, a per-capita growth rate of zero means that 
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the overall economy is growing as rapidly as the population.  This is no mean feat in Africa, where 
population growth has been around 3 percent per year for most of the post-independence period.  But a 
growth rate of zero is far too pessimistic a benchmark from the perspective of conventional economic 
growth theory.  Economists have long emphasized that low-income countries can benefit from two 
forms of ‘catch-up’ growth relative to more advanced economies.  The first occurs via the movement of 
financial and even physical capital from where it is plentiful to where it is scarce.  The second, and 
quantitatively more important, occurs through the local implementation of globally available ideas and 
technologies.  For these reasons, economists expect the poorer of any two countries with similar 
institutions to grow faster over time than its richer neighbor, until the two economies have converged to 
the same growth path.14   
 
We show three dashed lines in the diagram.  The rightmost vertical line separates countries in SSA that 
grew at all in per-capita terms, to the left, from those that declined outright over the period.  The 
horizontal dashed line allows a direct comparison with the global experience during this period; it shows 
the average growth rate of developing countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa.  The leftmost vertical 
line separates countries in SSA that beat this global average, to the left, from those that that fell short, 
to the right.   
 
Figure 1  Country-level growth performance in SSA, 1974-94 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Notes: Figures in square brackets refer to percentages of SSA population. 
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The disaster depicted in Figure 1 is striking, and interpreting it has been a major intellectual challenge 
for growth economists.  Between 1974 and 1994 fully seventy-five percent of the region’s population 
lived in countries where per-capita incomes were declining.  Part of this was due to a global slowdown in 
economic growth; at 1.81 percent, developing countries outside of SSA were growing more slowly than 
their long-run average (since 1961) of roughly 2.5 percent.  But Africa’s decline was even more striking 
in comparative terms.  Only six tiny countries in SSA, collectively accounting for only 1 percent of the 
region’s population, were able to out-perform the average growth rate in non-SSA developing 
countries.15  These 20 years transformed a continent that had shaken off the fetters of colonialism into 
what Paul Collier recently called The Bottom Billion.16 
 
In Table 1, we view this period of decline through the lens of governance regimes.  Our argument is that 
for the bulk of African populations, the first generation of independence resulted in a leftward move in 
the table, rather than the anticipated move upwards.  On the financing side, fiscal crisis became 
widespread in the region by the late 1970s.  Aid donors financed an increasing share of government 
spending, accounting for the shift to the left column.  For much of the period between independence 
and 1994, African governments were more directly responsible to external donors, in setting public 
sector priorities and delivering public services, than they were to their own populations.  For practical 
purposes, the prioritization and delivery of collective goods was either absent or in external hands.  
 
Table 1 tries to do minimal justice to the heterogeneity of African experience during this period, by 
distinguishing development dependencies like Tanzania from failed states like the Democratic Republic 
of Congo.  We are nonetheless simplifying tremendously, and some countries, like Uganda, spent time in 
both conditions.  But the exceptions to the overall pattern prove the rule that public responsibility for 
collective goods matters.  Botswana made a successful transition to the upper left-hand box.  A 
responsive and democratically-elected government managed mineral wealth (mainly diamonds) 
responsibly, distributed its benefits widely, and subjected public spending projects to serious cost-
benefit analysis.17  Mauritius moved towards middle-income status through careful management of 
sugar export preferences and the establishment of an export platform in textiles, relying partly on aid 
but largely on domestic revenue mobilization.18  In both countries, governments intervened judiciously 
in markets, not seeking to displace private activity but to strengthen the private investment 
environment.   
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4. Governance and Growth Since 1994 
 
The African development narrative that emerged from the 1974-94 period was one of tragedy.  The 
period ended with fully 1/3 of the region in civil war, life expectancies falling due to HIV/AIDS, and 
foreign aid levels declining sharply.  The narrative survives to this day in newspaper coverage of Africa 
and in popular movies like Blood Diamonds and The Last King of Scotland.  Our central message in this 
section, however, is that over the course of these lost decades, large parts of Africa began to make a 
transition from the bottom row of Table 1 to the top row.  This was fundamentally an institutional 
transition rather than an economic one, but it created a platform for sustained economic success and 
the consolidation of reforms.  
 
Figure 2 shows how dramatically different the growth picture has been over the past 15 years.  
Economic decline was rare after 1995 and was mainly limited to cases of acute conflict or political 
instability.  The few sizeable countries that declined over this period – Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Somalia, and Zimbabwe – attracted much of the press.  But fully 85 percent of the region’s population 
has been living in countries with rising per-capita incomes.  Nearly 40 percent have been living in 
countries whose growth rates exceeded the global average for other developing countries – thereby 
displaying, finally, the convergence pattern predicted by conventional growth theory.   
 
What accounts for this success, and is it sustainable?  In our view, the growth transition in Africa reflects 
a much deeper transition in the quality of the investment environment.   We indicate this in Table 1 with 
an upwards arrow – from development dependencies and failed states to ‘Emerging Africa’.   The phrase 
comes from an important new book by Stephen Radelet, the chief economist of USAID.19  Radelet argues 
that 17 non-oil countries in SSA have embarked on paths of sustained economic growth since the mid-
1990s.  He cites a set of interlocking causes, but primary among these are market-based economic 
reforms that began in the mid-1980s and have increased the rewards for productive economic activity; 
and democratic reforms that began in the late 1980s and have widened civil liberties and imposed 
meaningful constraints on executive power.  In what follows, we highlight some of the most important 
trends, and ask what role donors have played, and are likely to play, in Africa’s new departure. 
 
We have intentionally depicted a purely vertical transition in Table 1, from the southwest corner to the 
northwest rather than the northeast corner.  Two categories inhabit the northwest cell.  The first 
comprises former development dependencies and/or failed states that remain heavily dependent on 
external assistance but are now driving the development process internally rather than simply 
responding to donors.  Examples include Tanzania and Mali in the first category, and Rwanda and 
Mozambique in the second.  The second comprises resource-rich countries like Botswana, where 
collective goods are financed mainly through mineral rents rather than aid.  Neither group has made the 
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ultimate transition to an economy in which domestic revenue mobilization sustains the public provision 
of collective goods.  Both groups, however, are to be distinguished from countries like Sudan or Somalia, 
where neither domestic nor foreign actors are providing core collective goods like security, or Burundi, 
where foreign donors continue to play a dominant role not just in financing but also in prioritization and 
delivery.   
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online. 
Note: GNQ refers to Equatorial Guinea, growing at 22.6% per year due to offshore oil. 
 
Economic forecasting is of course treacherous, but in making the case for a growth turnaround we are 
no longer taking a minority position.  In sharp contrast to its experience during the global recession of 
the early 1980s, Sub-Saharan Africa maintained robust growth through the global financial crisis of 
2008-09.  The International Monetary Fund, in its latest medium-term growth projections, has Sub-
Saharan Africa growing more rapidly than any other region worldwide, with the exception of Asia, where 
China’s extraordinary growth dominates the picture.  These projections refer to total GDP rather than 
per-capita growth (and so reflect Africa’s fast population growth), but the per-capita projections also 
suggest that the achievements depicted in Figure 2 will continue. 
 
We argued above that growth is a necessary condition for sustainable poverty reduction, and poverty 
rates have indeed been falling on the continent for roughly a decade, albeit slowly.  The World Bank 
predicts that SSA will not achieve the first Millennium Development Goal of halving its 1990 poverty 
headcount by the year 2015, but that it will come reasonably close, with the countries of Emerging 
Non-SSA avg = 2.44
(GNQ = 22.6%)
above
[39%]
below
[61%]
declining
[15%]
-1
0
0
1
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
0 10 20 30 40 50
country rank
Circles show relative population size. Non-SSA refers to developing only.
Figure 2. SSA growth rates, 1995-2009
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Africa leading the way.20  In those that have grown steadily over the full period, like Ghana, the goal will 
be achieved. 
 
5.  Overcoming isolation 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa is the most sparsely populated region on the globe, the region with its population 
furthest from coastlines and ocean-navigable rivers, and the region with the highest proportion of its 
population living in landlocked countries.  This isolation lowers incomes, and because economic growth 
depends on access to markets, ideas, and public infrastructure capital, it also makes growth more 
expensive.   Economists Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier have argued that geographical isolation may give 
rise to a poverty trap in Africa: a situation in which countries are too poor to grow.21   
 
The growth record since 1995 suggests that while the costs of isolation may be high, some may be 
policy-related and therefore amenable to reform, while others may be eroded via external 
developments in technology. Drawing on two of Radelet’s leading trends, we briefly examine the impact 
of reforms on regional integration and peer pressure, and the striking diffusion of mobile phone 
technology on the continent.   
 
One of the most powerful impacts of market-based economic reforms has been to narrow cross-country 
differences in the regulation of trade and the conduct of macroeconomic policy.  Many policy changes 
have been institutionalized since the mid-1990s, via the adoption of new central bank charters, Article 
VIII status in the IMF, membership of the World Trade Organization, and encompassing and forward-
looking budget processes.22  On the political side, differences in civil liberties and executive 
accountability have been narrowed through constitutional commitments to multi-party elections and 
freedom of the press.  These reforms are a work in progress; international commitments can be 
implemented fitfully or reneged upon, and constitutions can be renegotiated.  But their 
institutionalization makes them harder to reverse, both procedurally and via the creation of beneficiary 
interest groups that will oppose reversal.  Constitutional term limits, for example, have routinely (and 
sometimes successfully) been contested by incumbents like President Museveni of Uganda, but in many 
cases, popular opposition has prevented a softening of limits and has forced a peaceful electoral 
transition.   
 
Economic and political reforms reduce isolation on a country-by-country basis by opening populations to 
external trade, promoting freer exchange of ideas, and securing the gains of foreign investors from 
public predation.  But they are also beginning to dismantle the practical and ideological barriers to 
regional integration on the continent.  The East African Community is a leading example of this 
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and strong incentives for corruption. 
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phenomenon.  A legacy of the colonial period, the EAC was a dead letter by the late 1960s, as Presidents 
Kenyatta (Kenya), Obote (Uganda), and Nyerere (Tanzania) chose divergent approaches to the local 
realities of nation-building.  The three countries abandoned integration altogether in 1977, two years 
before Nyerere’s army invaded Uganda to unseat the dictator Idi Amin.  Nearly 25 years later, in 2001, 
the democratically elected heads of state reconstituted the EAC, committing the three countries to a 
process of economic integration now underpinned by a convergence of economic and political 
institutions.  The special economic value of integration for landlocked countries was not lost on Burundi 
and Rwanda, who each joined the community in 2007.  South Sudan may well be next, and from the 
perspectives of security and economic management the logic of South Sudan’s participation is strong.   
 
Policy convergence also provides a platform for peer pressure.  The New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD), for example, relies on the voluntary participation by countries in a set of 
oversight protocols, with signatories to each protocol consenting to regular publicized external reviews 
of their performance in domains like corporate governance.  In the political and security arenas, African 
governments have shown increasing resolve in condemning non-democratic leadership transitions.23  
These peer pressure mechanisms are in tension with a long-standing legacy of mutual non-interference 
on the continent, which makes them all the more powerful as expressions not just of mutually 
understood interests but also of expanded capacity for collective action.   
 
A second and fundamentally fortuitous channel through which isolation is being overcome in Africa is 
through the spread of mobile phone technology.  Earlier we emphasized the advantages of catch-up 
growth in the technological realm: the idea that a low-income country can import new ideas and 
technologies at fractions of what it cost for them to be developed.  The catch-up principle has been 
powerfully illustrated in the public health arena, where diffusion of basic medicines and principles of 
sanitation have allowed low-income developing countries to narrow health gaps vis-à-vis richer 
countries.  But industrial and communication technologies usually come with demanding infrastructure 
and maintenance requirements.  Major technological developments can therefore widen income gaps as 
easily as narrowing them.  Until recently, for example, internet access required a reliable land line, a 
continuous power supply, a working desktop computer and modem, and the relevant proprietary 
software.  In African countries, the power and telecoms sectors operated as natural monopolies and 
were often subject to high costs and gross inefficiencies.  Low incomes and hostile regulatory 
environments imposed further barriers by hampering the growth of the requisite hardware, software, 
and service markets.  The internet was therefore available to overcome isolation in North America, but 
not in Africa.   
 
As Radelet and others emphasize, mobile phones have leapfrogged land lines in Africa.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the fastest-growing mobile phone market in the world; more than a third of the population has 
a mobile phone subscription, a greater proportion than in India, the home of the outsourcing 
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July/August, 2011: 130-41. 
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revolution.24  New uses are being developed daily, in agriculture, finance, health, journalism, and many 
other arenas; the common denominator is a shrinking of distance, a function that passes a cost/benefit 
test in Africa more fundamentally, perhaps, than anywhere.  As smartphones and related technologies 
become economically viable on the continent, the barriers to internet access may rapidly erode.   
 
6. Foreign Aid: the Adjustment Era and the Development Window 
 
What role has foreign aid played in the transformation we are describing?  The region’s growth 
performance since 1995 suggests that sweeping indictments of foreign aid are oversold.25  Our interest, 
however, is less in the aid effectiveness debate than in how the nature of the aid relationship has 
evolved over time.  We emphasize two major transitions in the post-independence period.  The first 
occurred with the end of the Cold War, which ushered in what we call the ‘development window’ – a 
decade-long period during which the parties to African aid broke free of the conflicts of interest inherent 
in superpower rivalries and contending development paradigms.  The development window saw donors 
embrace a norms-based approach to aid – first around the goal of poverty reduction, and then 
increasingly around ownership and accountability as guiding principles in the aid relationship.  These 
norms survived the closure of the development window, which we date to the September 11, 2001 
attacks in the United States, and (less definitively) to the emergence of China as a geo-strategic 
counterweight to the West.   
 
Table 2 juxtaposes developments in the aid regime with the evolution of governance regimes in Africa.  
Late colonial governments tended to adopt a paternalist approach, devolving responsibility and 
resources to local elites in the hope of maintaining strong political ties and safeguarding the positions of 
expatriate interests.  In the early post-independence period, this was supplanted by project-based aid 
across a wide range of public infrastructure and services.  By the late 1970s, however, the structural 
adjustment era was underway. 
 
Policy conditionality was the central principle of Western development aid to Africa from the late 1970s 
to the late 1990s.  Short-term (and non-concessional) IMF adjustment lending had always come with 
policy conditions designed to prevent a country’s balance of payments crisis from recurring or spreading 
to other countries, and to ensure that the Fund was quickly repaid.  Starting in the late 1970s, however, 
conditionality was taken up by Africa’s traditional development partners – the World Bank and the 
bilateral donors.  These donors shifted from project support towards quick-disbursing funds for imports 
and government spending – partly in response to macroeconomic collapse, but from an early stage, 
mainly in pursuit of a fundamental realignment of the economic role of African governments.  Structural 
adjustment conditionality centered initially on exchange rate unification, trade liberalization, and 
                                                          
24
 See Jenny Aker and Isaac Mbiti, “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 24(3), 2010:207-232. 
25
 Jeffrey Sachs and Bono attribute failure of aid to a lack of generosity and ambition among donors.  William 
Easterly says that aid fails because nobody’s job in a donor agency ever depends on its succeeding.  Dambisa Moyo 
argues that foreign grants sustain corrupt governments and derail development of the private sector.  These 
authors are worth reading; their views are readily accessible on the internet. 
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financial liberalization, in each case seeking to reduce the direct role of governments in allocating 
resources.  By the early 1990s it had moved on to deeper institutional reforms including the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.   
 
Table 2  Central principles of the aid relationship in Africa 
Principles of the Aid 
Relationship 
Role of the non-mineral domestic economy  
in financing collective goods 
Low High 
Role of the 
domestic 
government 
in prioritizing 
and 
delivering 
collective 
goods 
High 
 
 
            Emerging Africa 
Ownership & Accountability 
 
 
   Middle-Income Countries 
Graduation 
Low 
Development Dependencies 
Conditionality 
 
               Failed States 
Protection & Containment 
Late Colonial Regimes 
Paternalism 
 
By the mid-1990s, conditionality was widely regarded as a failure.  Growth had not (yet) responded, and 
poverty rates were still increasing.  Critics pointed to lack of resolve on the part of reforming 
governments and lack of credibility on the part of donors, noting as evidence the fitful and partial 
implementation of reforms and the tendency of donors to pay for the same reform multiple times.26  At 
a deeper level, and in a critique that gradually reshaped how aid was delivered, they faulted external 
donors for undermining the capabilities of African governments to direct the development process.   
 
The efficacy of conditionality received a fundamental boost with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  These events abruptly eliminated market-contrary socialism from serious 
consideration as a development strategy in Africa.27  At the same time they removed the strategic 
overlay from development assistance policies in the United States – already the dominant shareholder 
in the IMF and World Bank, and now world’s sole superpower.  The result was to narrow the conflicts of 
interest that had bedeviled conditionality – conflicts between market-oriented donors and African 
governments, and between donors backing divergent views of the appropriate role of government.  In 
the end, therefore, conditionality departed on a high note – arguably more effective than ever before, 
doomed not by its failings as much as by the new ambitions appropriate to a post-reform, post Cold-War 
era.  
 
                                                          
26
 An early and insightful statement is Collier, Paul (1991), “Africa’s External Relations, 1961-91” African Affairs. 
27
 The phrase ‘market-contrary’ is from Mancur Olson, in Power and Prosperity. 
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The decade of the 1990s – or more accurately, the period from 11/9 to 9/1128 – was a coherent and 
even transformative interlude in development assistance.  Aid to Africa declined sharply in the first half 
of the 1990s.  Donors turned their attentions to the transition economies and, within Africa, applied 
greater selectivity across country programs by shutting down assistance to unsavory governments, 
particularly those dragging their feet on democratic reforms.  Deeper changes in the aid regime then got 
underway in the second half of the 1990s, as the World Bank and the United Nations sought to revive 
rich-country constituencies for development assistance.  Two concerns had to be balanced: one, that 
large aid programs could undermine the institutional maturation that was necessary for achieving 
middle-income status: in World Bank parlance, countries had to ‘own’ their development programs, 
even if donors paid for them.  Second, ownership in the abstract was a non-starter: the programs 
chosen by African governments had to be attractive enough to be bankrolled by Western governments 
and taxpayers.   
 
In the two major aid initiatives of the decade, donors addressed these concerns through an appeal to 
shared norms.  Poverty reduction – recalling what Catholic teaching had earlier called “a preferential 
option for the poor”29 – became the centerpiece of the aid relationship.  Countries were obliged to 
develop formal poverty reduction strategies to qualify for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) multilateral debt relief initiative of the World Bank and IMF; in the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals initiative (formalized in 2000), donors and recipient governments alike committed 
themselves to cutting 1990 poverty headcounts in half by 2015.  The focus on poverty reduction served, 
in our view, not just as an effective rallying point among donors, but also as an instrument for progress 
both on the ownership front, as the poverty reduction strategy process fostered (and was effectively 
displaced by) a return to long-range development planning at the country level, and on the 
accountability front, as the adoption of quantitative targets fostered a focus on results by both donors 
and recipients. 
 
7. New Players and New Priorities 
 
The aid regime of the 2000s diverged in some striking ways from that of the 1990s. In the international 
relations realm, the war against terror and the economic emergence of China placed the norms-based 
approach of the 1990s under pressure.   The entry of new private actors like the Gates Foundation 
raised the performance bar for traditional donors and fostered substantial progress in specialized areas 
including health.  Finally, the countries of emerging Africa re-engaged the development planning 
processes that had been marginalized by a generation of crisis and reform, and took the initiative in 
placing economic growth squarely back on the development agenda. 
 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 reoriented US foreign policy around the war on terror.  Africa 
became a target of heightened security interest for the US, given the region’s historical ties to Islam, 
                                                          
28
 The Berlin Wall fell on 11/9/1989. 
29
 See Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus (1991), written on the hundredth anniversary of Rerum 
Novarum. The ‘option for the poor’ dates from Gutiérrez, Gustavo, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and 
Salvation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973. 
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proximity to the Middle East, and role as staging ground for Islamist attacks on US embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania.  The development window therefore ended on 9/11, in the sense that US aid policy in 
Africa would now have to be consonant with pressing geo-strategic objectives.  At least to date, 
however, the net impact of the new strategic context has probably been to increase both the quantity 
and the quality of US aid to Africa. 
 
The causal lines are not fully clear, but the Bush Administration showed a sharply increased interest in 
aid to Africa.  By presidential directive, the US took the lead in the fight against HIV/AIDS and malaria.  
Faith-based non-governmental organizations found increasing support, becoming important conduits of 
US bilateral assistance.  In a final innovation, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) became the main 
channel for US bilateral assistance to the poorest countries.  The MCA was designed to institutionalize a 
high-ownership, high-accountability approach to aid.  Countries that score well on a set of indicators of 
governance and policy become eligible to submit proposals for large, multi-year packages that are free 
of conditionality but build in rigorous impact assessment.  Eligibility and allocation decisions for this 
portion of the aid budget have been shifted out of the State Department, to the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, a quasi-independent body. 
  
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 marked that country’s emergence as a major 
player in the international arena.  Chinese aid to Africa continues to grow rapidly, and comes as part of a 
much larger package including trade and foreign investment.  Our framework suggests two observations 
regarding the likely development impact in Africa.  The first follows from China’s own political economy, 
which combines authoritarian government with an aggressive pursuit of business interests and a self-
protective commitment to non-interference.   China presents African governments with a sharp 
alternative to the institutions and norms of Western aid.  This is likely to widen the articulation we have 
already emphasized in Tables 1 and 2.  Where economic and political reforms are substantially 
consolidated, as in emerging Africa, countries will benefit from a widening of ideas and financial options 
– and, it should be acknowledged, from an erosion of the monolithic bargaining power of Western 
donors.  Where the investment environment is weaker, the same channels are likely to slow institutional 
progress by entrenching the power of authoritarian leaders, as in Sudan and Zimbabwe.   
  
The second line of influence operates along the columns, via the structure of African trade.  China is 
simultaneously a competitor to Africa in world manufacturing markets and a source of demand and 
foreign direct investment in natural resources.  Its increasing weight in the world economy therefore 
tends to deepen Africa’s comparative advantage in natural resources.  This in turn slows the emergence 
of manufacturing in Africa and increases the reliance of African governments on commodity rents.  
Within our framework, these rents may slow institutional progress by reducing the pressure for 
domestic revenue mobilization.  On the reverse side, of course, where institutions are already strong, 
commodity rents can be leveraged into public investments that improve the investment environment. 
  
Particularly in the health arena, private-sector actors in the industrial countries now play a more 
prominent role in Africa than they have in the past, both as providers of their own funds and as delivery 
mechanisms for assistance from sovereign donors (e.g., running aid-financed health clinics).  The major 
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foundations subscribe to the norms-based approach of Table 2 and often work more directly with civil 
society than the multilateral institutions or bilateral donors can do.  The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, instituted by the G8 countries in 2002, has served as a highly effective 
coordinating mechanism, channeling funds from both public and private sources to recipient 
governments and non-governmental service providers (foreign and domestic NGOs) and ensuring that 
priorities and coordination are driven by the host government. 
  
A striking feature of the 2000s is the return of African governments to long-range development 
planning.  In a fundamental display of ownership, these plans depart in some striking ways from the 
MDG framework – emphasizing participatory long-run growth rather than human development per se, 
and stressing macroeconomic stability, infrastructure, financial development and export 
competitiveness.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Our aim in this paper has been to do justice to an epochal change in development prospects in Africa.  A 
large portion of the continent has gone through far-reaching economic and political reforms and has 
reaped substantial benefits in terms of sustained economic growth.  While few stakeholders are 
satisfied with the impact of growth on the poorest, the terrain of this debate is fundamentally changed:  
before growth, there was nothing to distribute, and before democratic reforms, there was nothing to 
discuss.  Under pressure from their own populations, the governments of emerging Africa are struggling 
to accelerate the growth process, to improve its employment content, and to make markets work for 
the poor. We believe that progress to date will be sustained, and that the narrative of emerging Africa 
will become the narrative of the continent. 
 
We close by considering some implications of our analysis for faith-based NGOs in Africa.  Official 
development assistance became a major source of funding for NGOs during the 2000s, reflecting their 
focus on human development and comparative advantage in delivering services at the local level.  For 
Catholic NGOs in particular, the evolution of donor priorities and policies was surely striking: poverty 
reduction, ownership, and accountability are central themes of Populorum Progressio.  These NGOs 
became natural conduits for donor funds in Africa. 
 
Two challenges seem critical as faith-based NGOs seek to deepen their development contribution in 
Africa.  The first is that the funding process puts Western NGOs into competition for service delivery 
with African NGOs and African governments.  Our framework suggests that Western NGOs will have to 
remain vigilant in building local capacities – an area in which they arguably have a strong comparative 
advantage over official donors – to avoid being at odds with the advances in ownership and institutional 
development that are critical to Africa’s progress.   
 
The second challenge brings us back to the investment environment.  Each development partnership 
between a donor or service provider and an African population is to some degree a struggle for hearts 
and minds.  Africa is of immense practical importance for the Catholic Church in terms of participation 
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and vocations; and since 9/11 the Western donors have viewed Islam with strategic concern.  The 
changing aid terrain therefore suggests that religion may become a more important locus of struggle in 
the coming years.  Looking ahead, one of the fundamental challenges facing faith-based NGOs and 
bilateral donors is that of embracing Africa’s interest in an inclusive and tolerant politics. 
